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Reversible Rewards
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This article offers a new mechanism of private enforcement, combining sanctions and
rewards into a scheme of “reversible rewards.” The enforcing party sets up a precommitted fund and offers it as reward to another party to refrain from violation. If
the violator turns down the reward, the enforcer can use the money in the fund for
one purpose only—to pay for punishment of the violator. The article shows that this
scheme doubles the effect of funds invested in enforcement and allows the enforcer
to stop violations that would otherwise be too costly to deter. It argues that reversible
rewards could be used to bolster the enforcement of rights in selective areas of private
and international law and could also be applied strategically in litigation in contexts
where compliance incentives are otherwise weak. (JEL: K42)

1. Introduction
There are two general ways of inducing people into action. One is
to reward them for the desired behavior; the other is to punish them for
undesired behavior. The typical normative inquiry in the compliance literature focuses on the carrot-versus-stick selection and asks when one
device is more effective than the other (Wittman, 1984; Levmore, 1986;
Dari-Mattiacci, 2009; Dari-Mattiacci and Geest, 2010). A basic insight
derived from this literature is that sanctions are superior to rewards when
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they are credible: a credible threat of sanctions does not need to be carried
out and thus costs nothing. An effective reward, in contrast, needs to be
paid. The typical descriptive inquiry seeks to explain legal patterns: Does
the law’s (frequent) use of sanctions and (less frequent) use of rewards conform to the theory of efficient enforcement?
This article offers a new insight into how to create incentives to comply when conventional enforcement methods are unable to generate compliance. The idea is simple: instead of choosing between sanctions and
rewards, an efficient enforcement scheme could combine the two. If sanctions and rewards are interlocked together in a particular way, compliance
can be obtained at a lower cost. Specifically, we develop a novel concept of
reversible rewards; a reward that is offered to the recipient who complies
with its donor’s demands, reinforced with a threat that the same reward could
be reversed against this recipient in case of non-compliance and be used to
pay for a sanction. We show that reversible rewards can induce compliance
in situations where simple sanctions or simple rewards are too costly and
therefore fail.
Reversible rewards work as follows. One party—the “Enforcer,” who
is seeking to influence the behavior of another party, the “Violator”—sets
up a reversible reward fund. The money in the fund is pre-committed and
cannot be recovered by the Enforcer. This money is offered to the Violator
as a reward for choosing a course of conduct that the Enforcer prefers. If
the Violator turns down the reward and does not change its behavior, the
Enforcer can use the money in the fund for one purpose only: as reimbursement for the cost of sanctioning the Violator.
We demonstrate that this scheme doubles the incentive effect that money
spent on enforcement generates. This doubling effect is desirable—in fact,
crucial—in situations in which either simple sanctions or simple rewards
are ineffective. A sanction or a reward might be ineffective because they
are too costly. Sanctions could be too expensive for the Enforcer relative to
the harm they save. Similarly, rewards sufficient to buy off the Violator’s
compliance might be too high. In these scenarios, where ordinary inducements to comply are too costly, reversible rewards can fill the void. Under
the conditions that we specify, reversible rewards can achieve deterrence at
(roughly) half the cost. This leads Violators to comply in a greater number
of circumstances than conventional compliance schemes suggest.
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To illustrate intuitively the double effect of reversible rewards, imagine
a corporation or an individual trying to influence the policies of election
candidates through a campaign contribution of a fixed sum. The money can
be offered to candidate A or to candidate B for some quid pro quo—some
policy that a candidate is willing to support in return for this contribution.
But the contributor can do better than offering one candidate the reward.
It can instead offer a reversible reward by setting up a fund, depositing the
contribution into it, and offering candidate A the choice between taking this
sum and having it directed to candidate B. If candidate A declines, he loses
twice: he loses the spending advantage over his rival that this money could
buy and he allows his rival to gain a spending advantage by receiving this
sum. The “wedge” that the reversible reward creates (the difference in the
spending capacity of the two candidates) is doubled to twice the face value
of the reward. This means that the contributor can get the same quid pro
quo that any simple contribution buys at half the cost by using a reversible
contribution.
Reversible rewards could be used in private enforcement of rights: a
rightholder could offer a Violator a smaller reward for ending the violation, coupled with the threat that declining the reward would lead to a certain (pre-committed) sanction. For example, a property owner can offer a
neighbor a sum of money to cease a nuisance, with the threat that if such
a reward were declined, this money would be directed toward some form
of retaliation. Reversible rewards could also be used in litigation: a defendant could offer a plaintiff a smaller settlement, coupled with the threat that
declining the settlement offer would free this money for trial and attrition.
Similarly, reversible rewards can be used in contractual relations. When performance of a service becomes costlier than envisioned, the incentives to
renege on the contract arise. Here, the client can offer a modest reward for
the completion of the contracted service, coupled with the threat to use the
same money to finance an enforcement action, if necessary. Importantly,
states could resort to reversible rewards to enhance compliance with international law, which suffers from weak or inexistent supranational enforcement
institutions. To induce action by another state—for example, to reduce carbon emissions or to end a nuclear program—a fund can be established and
offered as a reversible reward. If turned down, this fund would then finance
what is otherwise a costly and non-credible threat to impose economic or
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even military sanctions. Compliance can thus be bought at a substantially
lower cost.
The concept of reversible rewards contributes to the rewards-versussanctions inquiry. It also advances the literature on credible enforcement
by private parties. This literature has wrestled with the question how legal
rights can be protected when rightholders’ threats to enforce those rights are
not credible. The solutions to the credibility problem often build on some
nuanced understanding of the costs of enforcement and on various mechanisms to commit to expending these costs (Bebchuk, 1988, 1996; Bebchuk
and Guzman, 1996; Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 2009). In this paper we offer
a solution that has not been previously proposed or applied. Our task, therefore, is to argue that reversible rewards are plausible, promoting private
enforcement in areas where the reach of ordinary sanctions and rewards
is limited.
Before proceeding, it is important to understand the intended scope of the
reversible rewards and the central limits to its application. A crucial assumption underlying the idea of reversible rewards is that sanctions are costly.
When that is not the case, simple sanctions always dominate reversible
rewards: a credible threat to sanction the Violator can deter the violation
at no cost to the Enforcer. Our inquiry is, therefore, limited to situations
where the enforcement of rights is costly and no credible threat to sanction
exists as a result.
However, we must also ask whether the pre-commitment device that we
rely on to bolster the reversible rewards could similarly be harnessed to
enhance the credibility of simple sanctions. If this were the case, reversible
rewards would lose their advantage over sanctions. The intuition behind this
argument is the following. If the Enforcer can pre-commit to imposing the
sanction when the reversible reward is declined, it should similarly be able
to make an irrevocable commitment to simply sanction the Violator. With
such a commitment in place, the Violator would be deterred and the costly
sanction would not have to be expended.
Yet this logic fails upon a closer scrutiny. Such a pre-commitment to a
simple sanction would not be superior to a pre-commitment to reversible
rewards because it would be more expensive than the mechanism we propose. If pre-commitment is achieved by sinking the costs of enforcement
into an irrevocable fund, the advantage of a reversible reward in comparison
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2. An Illustration of the Argument
Party A engages in an activity that is harmful to Party B, which Party
B seeks to stop. Denote Party A as the “Violator” and Party B as the
“Enforcer.” There are two ways in which the Enforcer can induce the Violator to discontinue its harmful behavior. It can either sanction the Violator
for causing the harm or it can reward the Violator, conditional on the Violator ceasing the violation. Both sanctions and rewards are assumed to be

Downloaded from http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/ at Columbia University Libraries on February 9, 2016

with a simple sanction is that it requires a smaller fund. To be sure, in
equilibrium the reversible reward fund ends up being depleted (as the reward
has to be paid), whereas the simple sanction fund remains unspent (yet the
violation is deterred). But, importantly, even if unspent, the money sunk
upfront to create a credible threat to inflict a simple sanction may not be
recouped in any way, or else the pre-commitment would be compromised
and the incentive to inflict the sanction undermined.
The reversible rewards mechanism is cheaper than a mechanism relying on sanctions alone, but its practical application may be limited. First, as
we noted, simple sanctions are always superior to reversible rewards when
a threat of sanctions is credible and thus need not be carried out. Simple
sanctions are also superior if the same pre-committed fund can be reused to
address sequential violations by multiple actors. In equilibrium the money
in a simple sanction fund remains unspent. Accordingly, it can be reused to
induce compliance of additional potential violators. In contrast, the funds
necessary to finance multiple reversible rewards would have to be sequentially replenished. Accordingly, we conclude that reversible rewards are
potentially valuable in settings of unique, specific violations and are not
valuable in the case of systematic, generic violations.
One last methodological clarification is in order. Reversible rewards help
parties enforce private rights, regardless of the social desirability of such
enforcement. The next section illustrates our argument using a scenario in
which the violation of the private right is inefficient, and thus the improved
enforcement through reversible rewards is socially desirable. But we note
that private parties may at times use rewards to deter socially desirable conduct as well. In this sense, the analysis is descriptive, not normative.
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2.1. Simple Sanctions
The Enforcer can impose any level of sanction on the Violator. In order to
deter the violation, the sanction has to be at least $80, which equals the Violator’s gain from violation. Thus, such a sanction costs the Enforcer at least
$120.
A simple sanction is not effective in this situation. Often sanctions are
levied after the harm has already occurred and thus have only a retaliatory
effect. But assuming that the sanction has an incapacitating effect, forcing
the Violator to cease the harmful activity, it would only be rational for the
Enforcer to impose it if the cost of such a sanction does not exceed the
harm it eliminates. Since the cost of such a sanction for the Enforcer is
at least $120, it exceeds the harm of $100 that the Enforcer suffers from
the violation. Thus, the Enforcer’s threat to inflict even an incapacitating
sanction is not credible. A Violator, recognizing this, is not deterred by the
threat of a sanction. Thus, simple sanctions fail to stop the violation.
The simple sanction would not work even under an assumption that the
Enforcer could pre-commit the funds to later pay for the sanction. The sum
necessary to fund such a pre-commitment would still be $120, more than
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costly for the Enforcer. Rewards are costly because they have to be paid out
in full. Sanctions are costly for various reasons: they often entail litigation
costs necessary to collect compensation, resources spent on retaliation, and
the possibility of counter-retaliation by the Violator, to name a few. The
challenge is to devise an enforcement scheme that stops the violation at the
minimum private cost to the Enforcer.
To make the problem concrete, assume that the Violator’s activity causes
a harm of $100 to the Enforcer. Assume, also, that the gain enjoyed by the
Violator is only $80. It is, therefore, socially optimal to cease the violation.
To achieve this, the Enforcer can inflict a sanction s on the Violator, but
let us assume that the cost of inflicting such a sanction is greater than s.
Specifically, assume that the cost is 1.5s. For example, to inflict a loss of
$100 on the Violator the Enforcer would have to bear a cost of $150. Alternatively, the Enforcer can offer a reward r , and let us assume that the cost
of such reward is r . That is to say, sanctions cost the Enforcer more than the
pain they inflict on the Violator, whereas rewards consist of simple transfers
of cash.
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the cost of the harm. With such pre-commitment, the violation would be
deterred and the fund would not have to be used. But since the money is
committed, it may not be recouped by the Enforcer, once the violation is
deterred, or else it would not be regarded as a sunk cost. And if the money is
not considered truly sunk, the threatened sanction loses its deterrent effect.
Thus, the dilemma remains: The Enforcer must spend $120 to stop the harm,
or endure the $100 harm.

Alternatively, the Enforcer can induce the Violator to cease its violation
by offering a reward. Since the Enforcer has more to lose from the violation than the Violator has to gain—recall that we assume that the violation is
inefficient—there is room for a Coasian bargain, a “bribe.” Any reward of at
least $80 and of no more than $100 would make both parties better off. Let
us assume that the Enforcer can successfully offer a reward of slightly more
than $80 in return for the Violator ceasing the violation. Under some conditions, rewards would cost more (up to $100). But the question we explore
here is whether the Enforcer can do even better. Can compliance be induced
at a cost lower than $80?

2.3. Reversible Rewards
The core contribution of this paper is to devise an enforcement mechanism that reduces the cost of enforcement. We call it “reversible rewards”
because it uses a reward to lure the Violator, but also reverses the reward
against the Violator if the Violator continues its harmful conduct. The
reversible rewards scheme has three simple elements:
(1)
(2)
(3)

The Enforcer deposits money in an irrevocable fund, which could
be used for two alternative purposes, as follows.
If the Violator ceases the harmful activity, the entire money in the
fund is given to the Violator as reward.
If the Violator does not cease the harmful activity, the money in the
fund is used to reimburse the Enforcer for the cost of sanctioning.

Under this scheme, the reward offered to the Violator is backed up by an
explicit threat: if the violation continues, not only will the Violator forfeit the reward, but it will also bear a sanction. Other than for sanction
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2.2. Simple Rewards
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2.4. Reversible Reward: Why It Works
The example above illustrated that the reversible reward scheme can succeed where simple sanctions fail and that it costs less than a simple reward.
Two distinct factors interact to explain why the success of this scheme is
general and not merely an artifact of the particular example we chose: (1)
the double effect of the expenditure—using the same money to fund both
the reward and the punishment and (2) solving the problem of the credibility
of threats to sanction through a pre-commitment device.
2.4.1. The double effect. A reversible reward uses the same money twice.
In Section 1, we illustrated this double effect through an example of how
a campaign contribution is offered to two opposing candidates, operating
once as a carrot and another time as a stick. There, a non-complying
candidate loses twice: first by forgoing the offered campaign contribution
and second, by having his or her opponent gain the advantage that the contribution buys. Put differently, the enhanced incentive to comply is generated
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reimbursement, the Enforcer cannot recoup the money in the fund. This
renders the Enforcer’s threat to impose the sanction credible.
A reversible reward would be significantly lower than the $80 that was
necessary for the simple reward. In fact, we show that the lowest sufficient
reversible reward is $48. To see why, consider first the maximum sanction
that the Enforcer would be willing to impose if the violation continues.
Expecting to be reimbursed up to $48 from the fund, the Enforcer would
have an incentive to inflict a sanction as high as s = 32. This sanction would
cost the Enforcer 1.5s (namely 1.5 × 32 = 48), exactly the amount available
in the fund. A sanction higher than $32 would not be fully reimbursed and
thus the threat to impose it would not be credible.
Recognizing the credibility of the threat to inflict a sanction of s = 32,
the Violator has to choose between two options: (i) a violation, which would
entail a net payoff of $48 (that is, a gain of $80 from continuing violation
minus a sanction of $32) or (ii) no violation, which would entitle him to the
reward of $48. Thus, endowing the fund with a little more than $48 would
be enough to make the Violator strictly prefer compliance to violation.
A reversible reward of at least $48 can therefore lead to full compliance.

164

American Law and Economics Review V15 N1 2012 (156–186)

1. Such a reversible reward fund could finance a sanction of $27. The Violator
would prefer to take the reversible reward of $54 rather than commit a violation and net
$80 − $27 = $53.
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by a “wedge” between the payoffs available from violation and from compliance. The greater this wedge, the stronger the incentive. This wedge can
be “stretched” in two directions: the Enforcer can offer a higher payoff for
compliance or a lower payoff for violation. A simple reward operates in the
first direction by offering a higher payoff for compliance. A simple sanction
operates in the second direction by offering a lower payoff for violation. A
reversible reward operates in both directions, doubling the absolute size of
the wedge.
The idea of resorting to both rewards and sanctions to influence parties’
incentives is not novel. But conventionally sticks and carrots are presented
as alternative ways of enhancing compliance. Under the law of restitution, a party who commits a desirable act—rescue, salvage, enhancement
of property value—can in some circumstances collect a reward from the
beneficiary. Under tort law, a party who commits an undesirable act—
injury, damage, destruction of property value—is in most circumstances
liable to pay compensation to the injured party. Saul Levmore (1986, 2000)
has identified cases of joint use of sanctions and rewards. For example,
some jurisdictions provide rewards for rescue and penalties for failure to
rescue. Or stores incentivize sales staff by offering commissions for high
sales and penalties for low sales. Furthermore, construction contracts sometimes include “risk versus reward” terms, with penalties for delayed completion and rewards for ahead-of-schedule completion. The reversible reward
mechanism is similar in utilizing the two-sided incentives, but it is designed
to address an additional concern—costly enforcement—by linking the funding of the sanctions and rewards.
We use the term “double” effect loosely. More precisely, the multiplier
effect of reversible rewards would depend on the cost function of the precise
sanctions. In the example above, we used a cost multiplier of 1.5s, and as a
result the reward fund of $80 was reduced to somewhat less than half, $48.
A multiplier of 2s, for example, would weaken the double effect, requiring
a reversible reward to at least $54.1 A more effective sanctioning mechanism, by contrast, would more than double the effect. For example, a cost
multiplier of less than 1, say 0.5s, would require a reversible reward of only
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$27.2 Thus, the cost structure of the sanction affects the exact size of the
necessary reversible reward fund, but its qualitative effect of delivering a
“dual punch” is maintained in all settings.3 Simply, the more effective the
sanctions, the smaller the necessary reversible reward.

2. Such a reversible reward fund could finance a sanction of $54. The Violator
would prefer to take the reversible reward of $27 rather than commit a violation and net
$80 − $54 = $26.
3. In some settings, a reward could also entail excess cost—the money paid by
the Enforcer is more than the money received by the Violator. This factor would reduce
the efficacy of rewards generally, but it would not undermine the advantage of reversible
rewards. In our original numerical example, if a reward of r now costs 1.25r , a simple
reward of $80 would cost $100. A reversible reward fund, when the sanction has no excess
cost, would cost $45. Such a fund could finance a sanction of $45 and a reward of $36.
The Violator would prefer to take the reversible reward of $36 rather than commit a
violation and net $80 − $45 = $35.
4. Another mechanism that couples a pre-commitment with a double effect is Ian
Ayres’ StickK concept. See www.stickk.com. See also Ayres (2010). There, the precommitment is accomplished by contract with a third-party website, and the double effect
is created by directing the deposited bond to a charity least favorable to the designator,
in the event that the designated obligation is not fulfilled.
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2.4.2. Credible commitment. Reversible rewards can be used with or
without a pre-committed fund. We mentioned the risk-versus-reward
clauses in performance contracts and bonus-versus-fine schemes in employment contracts or incentive schemes. Such devices allow the principal to
motivate an agent using smaller magnitudes of bonuses and fines. The
reversible reward scheme we developed here adds another aspect—a precommitment of the fund—which bolsters the credibility of the threat to
reverse the reward into a sanction. Because of this pre-commitment of funds,
the Enforcer has nothing to lose by carrying out its threat to sanction. This is
particularly helpful in situations where the Enforcer has to inflict the sanction after having already suffered the harm, and thus would have no incentive to do so.
The problem of pre-commitment to enforcement has been studied
before, and this paper offers no new theory on how to resolve it. Contracts, irrevocable trusts, agency, reputation, sunk costs, and various
combinations of these mechanisms have been identified as commitment
devices.4 Reversible rewards are not a new commitment device, but rather
a method to take advantage of a particular pre-commitment strategy: the
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3. Formal Analysis
3.1. Framework
A risk-neutral Violator has an opportunity to engage in a conduct that
harms another risk-neutral party, the Enforcer. The benefit to the Violator
is b if it pursues the activity and 0 otherwise, and the harm to the Enforcer
is h if the Violator pursues the activity and 0 otherwise.
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irrevocable fund. Thus, the crux of our argument is that to the extent that
pre-commitment can be accomplished by pre-funding the cost of sanctions,
reversible rewards reduce the necessary fund size.
Simple sanctions may be thought of as superior to reversible rewards
under different commitment mechanisms. Consider, for example, a commitment to impose a sanction that is created by contract. The Enforcer
may enter into a contract with a third party Administrator (similar to a
“retainer” contract with an attorney), who, for a prepaid fee, would then
be contractually obligated to impose a sanction on the Violator. Knowing that the Administrator is thus bound, the Violator would be deterred.
Here, the Administrator would incur no actual cost in equilibrium, and
would therefore not have to be paid much ex ante. The problem with such
contractual commitment is the incentive of the Administrator to renege
at the time when an obligation to impose the costly sanction is triggered
by the contract. Knowing this, the Violator would not be deterred. To restore
the Administrator’s incentive to punish as required by the contract, either the
cost of sanctioning has to be pre-funded or the Enforcer has to threaten
the Administrator with a sanction for breaching the contract. Either way,
the problem of costly sanctions reappears—either for the Administrator
(vis-à-vis the Violator) or for the Enforcer (vis-à-vis the Administrator).
This suggests that the problem of costly enforcement has to be solved in a
way that goes beyond a contractual commitment. Whether the sanctioning
is done by the Enforcer himself or outsourced to a third party, it remains
costly, and the Enforcer needs to create a mechanism that renders the threat
to inflict the sanction credible. The mechanism we rely on is pre-funding
the cost of sanctioning, and the advantage of reversible rewards as opposed
to simple sanctions is in cutting the size of the fund by roughly one half.
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167

3.2. Simple Sanctions and Rewards
Let us consider as a benchmark the effect of simple sanctions. To deter
the harmful activity, the Enforcer has to threaten the Violator with a sanction
of at least b. When the sanction is merely retaliatory, this threat is not credible. If it imposes the sanction, the Enforcer’s payoff is −h − c(s); if it does
not impose the sanction, the Enforcer’s payoff is −h. The payoff is always
higher when the sanction is not imposed. Once the harm has occurred, the
Enforcer has no incentive to punish the Violator.
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The Enforcer can threaten to impose any sanction s, where sdenotes the
monetary equivalent of the disutility of the sanction to the Violator. The cost
of sanction to the Enforcer is c(s). For simplicity, assume that the sanction
cost function is linear: c(s) = α + βs, where α is a fixed cost of sanctioning
and β is a variable cost multiplier. In some cases, β can be negative, as when
the Enforcer collects a monetary fine or damages from the Violator. In other
cases, β is positive, representing resources the Enforcer has to invest in
inflicting the sanction.
The Enforcer can also offer the Violator a reward r for ceasing the
activity. The reward is monetary and thus involves a simple transfer from
the Enforcer to the Violator and does not generate additional implementation costs.
If the Violator engages in the harmful activity, its payoff is b − s + r and
the Enforcer’s payoff is −h − c(s) − r .
The parties are rational and have perfect information. The timing of their
interaction is as follows: at time 0, the Enforcer announces the sanctionand-reward scheme. At time 1, the Violator chooses whether or not to pursue the harmful activity. If it does, the Enforcer suffers an immediate harm
of h. At time 2, the Enforcer can impose a sanction in retaliation. Alternatively, if the Enforcer promised a reward and the Violator complied with
the conditions of that reward, the Enforcer must pay the reward. In this setting, the harm occurs immediately at time 1, before and irrespective of any
sanction. A sanction can therefore only inflict some cost on the Violator,
but it cannot prevent the Violator from engaging in the activity—hence,
the sanction is merely retaliatory. However, we also discuss the setting
where the sanction can be used to induce the Violator to cease its harmful
activity.
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(1)
(2)

The threat of sanctions is not credible
b < h.

Thus, if b < h < c(b), the reward works whereas a sanction does not. Finally,
if h < c(b) and h < b, neither sanctions nor rewards work—the Enforcer
would prefer to bear the harm.
In the remainder of the discussion, we will assume that c(b) > h and that
simple sanctions are thus too costly to be credible. We will explore whether
reversible rewards could induce compliance at a lower cost, and in a greater
set of circumstances, than simple rewards.

3.3. Reversible Rewards
At time 0, the Enforcer sets up a fund and endows it with U . The
Enforcer instructs that the fund can be used for either rewarding the Violator
for compliance or, failing that, rewarding the Enforcer for punishing the
Violator. These instructions cannot be modified or revoked. Specifically,
the Enforcer instructs that:
• If the Violator refrains from violation at time 1, the fund’s endowment
will be transferred in full to the Violator at time 2.
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Alternatively, if the sanction can cease the harmful activity and thereby
reduce the Enforcer’s harm to 0, punishment would be rational only if
c(b)  h. The Enforcer would have to impose a sanction of s = b to induce
the Violator to cease its activity, and would thus have to bear a cost of at least
c(b). The Enforcer would choose to pursue a sanction only if its cost were
lower than the harm from tolerating the violation. In this case the violation
can be eliminated, and the Enforcer’s payoff would be −c(b).
Consider now the effect of simple rewards. To induce the Violator to
cease the violation, the Enforcer needs to offer a reward of at least b. The
Enforcer would choose to do this if b < h; that is to say, when it is cheaper
to incur the cost of buying off the Violator’s compliance than to suffer the
harm of Violator’s non-compliance.
From the Enforcer’s perspective, an incapacitating sanction is superior to
a reward whenever the threat to impose such a sanction is credible (whenever c(b) < h)—here, the Enforcer would be able to deter the violation at
no cost since the threat need not be carried out. In contrast, rewards are
superior to sanctions when two conditions hold:
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• If the Violator commits the violation at time 1 and the Enforcer punishes him at time 2, the Enforcer’s actual cost of punishment will be
reimbursed from the fund, up to the full amount available in the fund.
• If the Violator commits the violation and the Enforcer does not punish
him, the money in the fund is squandered (e.g., donated to a neutral
charity).

s ∗ (U ) =

U −α
β

For example, if α = 0 and β = 2 (namely, c(s) = 2s)), then s ∗ (U ) = 1/2U .
The costlier it is to impose a sanction (i.e., the higher the values for α or β),
the lower the maximum sanction that the Fund can credibly support.
What is the minimum necessary fund to induce the Violator to forgo the
benefit b and thus refrain from the harmful activity altogether? Denote the
minimum fund by U(b). The maximum sanction that could be reimbursed
from this fund is s ∗ (U(b)). The Violator is faced with a choice: either to
refrain from the undesired activity and accept the reward of U(b), or engage
in the activity with a payoff of b − s ∗ (U(b)). Given the Violator’s choice,
the Enforcer chooses the minimum U that induces the Violator to refrain
from the activity:
U (b)  b − s ∗ (U (b))
which, after plugging for s ∗ (U) and rearranging, yields:
U (b) =

α + βb
1+β

Several observations can be made:
1.

Cheaper than simple rewards. The cost of a reversible reward is
lower than the cost of a simple reward any time
b>

α + βb
1+β
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Denote by s ∗ (U ) the maximum sanction that could be fully reimbursed
from a fund i.e., the highest possible sanction that meets the condition
c(s)  U . When c(s) = α + βs, then
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which holds whenever b > α. Notice that reversible rewards are
superior to simple rewards irrespective of β, the marginal cost
of sanctions. The intuition is this: any time α > b, the fixed cost
of sanction will deplete the reward fund before any pain can be
inflicted on the Violator. That is, sanctions are rendered completely ineffective. But if α is lower, sanctions can be used to some
(nonzero) degree, and with the ability to impose some sanction, the
reward necessary is reduced by the magnitude of this sanction.
Cheaper than simple sanctions. A fund that is used for the cost of
sanction alone has to be funded with c(b). The Enforcer would be
better off using a reversible reward scheme any time the cost of sanction exceeds the cost of the reversible reward fund:
α + βb =

3.

α + βb
1+β

which holds whenever β > 0. Notice that reversible rewards are
superior to a simple sanction irrespective of α, the fixed cost of
sanctions. Since α is factored into the Enforcer’s cost under both
regimes, its magnitude is irrelevant. Notice also that for any positive variable cost of sanction β (that is, any time the cost of the
sanction rises with the size of the sanction), a reversible reward is
cheaper than a simple sanction, and the higher β, the greater the
advantage of the reversible reward regime.
Example. Assume c(s) = 100 + s, and b = 200. The minimum
effective sanction is 200, which costs 300 to impose. The minimum simple reward is 200. A fund of U would generate a credible threat to impose a sanction s ∗ = U – 100. Thus, U = 1/2(100 +
b) = 150. The reversible reward scheme achieves compliance at a
cost of 150, less than the cost of simple sanctions or rewards. If
h > 150, a reversible reward credibly eliminates the harm, whereby
a simple sanction is not credible and a simple reward is costlier in
comparison.

3.4. Divisible Sanction Costs
By pre-committing a fund, the reversible reward scheme divides the
strategic decision into two stages—an initial stage in which the fund is set
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3.4.1. Numerical example. Return to the example studied in Section 2.
We assumed the Violator’s benefit to be $80, the harm from the activity
$100, and the cost of inflicting a sanction s 1.5s. Simple sanctions are not
credible because the Enforcer would need to incur a cost of at least $120
to stop the harm of $100. Cost divisibility could solve this credibility problem. The key would be for the Enforcer to lower its sanctioning costs at
time 2, when the decision to inflict the sanction is made. This can be accomplished by dividing its costs into a pre-committed sunk portion and a subsequent avoidable portion. The Enforcer would deposit just enough money
in the fund at time 0 (the sunk portion) to render credible its subsequent,
time 2 threat to expend the remaining cost of the sanction (the avoidable
portion)—thus ensuring that the time 2 threat would not need to be carried
out. In the above example, such a scheme would render the simple sanction

5. For a model of the effect of cost divisibility on the threat to enforce, see Bebchuk
(1996).
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and a later stage in which the fund is utilized. We now explore an additional
strategic advantage of this two-stage setting: the divisibility of costs. The
analysis here responds to the following intuition. If the sanction is costlier
than the harm it prevents—in the original example, the sanction of $120 was
required to deter a harm of $100—the Enforcer might still deter the Violator
by dividing the costs of sanctions across the two periods. In the first period,
before the Violator acts, the Enforcer sinks a portion of the sanction costs,
leaving the remainder to be spent in the second period, in case the violation occurs. Specifically, the Enforcer may sink upfront only $25, leaving
$95 to be spent ex post. Because the remaining portion of $95 of sanction
cost is less than the harm of $100, the threat to incur it becomes credible. As a result, the violation is deterred at a substantially lower sunk cost
of $25.5
We acknowledge the potential of divisible sanctions to generate compliance where non-divisible threats to sanction would not be credible. Yet,
we also demonstrate that even under the assumption that the Enforcer can
divide its sanctioning costs, reversible rewards are superior to simple sanctions because they require a smaller upfront sunk cost.
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3.4.2. Formal analysis. The Enforcer endows an irrevocable fund with U.
Consider, first, a scenario in which the fund is used solely to reimburse the
Enforcer for the cost of a sanction, but is not offered also as a reward to
the Violator. Expecting to be reimbursed up to U , the maximum sanction
that the Enforcer can credibly threaten to impose is s ∗ (U ), which is the
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effective. The Enforcer would initially need to deposit just over $20 in the
fund. If the Violator subsequently engages in the harmful activity, it would
cost the Enforcer less than $100 to inflict a sanction at a total cost of $120.
Since the upfront deposit into the fund is sunk and no longer factors into
its strategic calculation, it would be rational to spend anything under $100
to terminate the harm of $100. And since the threat to impose a sanction is
now credible, the Violator would be deterred. Thus, the Enforcer manages
to stop the harm by spending only $20 upfront, never having to actually
spend the additional $100.
While the divisibility of simple sanctions can render them cheaper than
simple rewards, the costs can be further lowered if, instead, the Enforcer
exploits the divisibility feature in setting up a reversible reward fund. Here,
the money sunk into the fund at time 0 can be used, not only to fund a
subsequent sanction at time 2 but also as a direct reward to the Violator,
if the Violator ceases its activity voluntarily at time 1. In this case, we can
show that the Enforcer only needs to deposit $8 in the fund—that is, the
cost to the Enforcer is reduced from $20 to $8. The reason is that if the
Violator is offered $8 as a reward to stop the harmful activity, the Enforcer
no longer has to threaten a full sanction of s = 80. Instead, a sanction of
s = 72 would suffice. This is because the wedge between a reward of $8 and
a sanction of $72 is, again, $80, equal to the Violator’s gain from the activity.
Accepting the reward confers to the Violator a payoff of $8. Continuing
the harmful activity would also lead to a net payoff of $8 for the Violator:
the benefit from activity ($80) minus a sanction ($72). In order to inflict a
sanction of s = 72, the cost to the Enforcer would be 1.5 × s, or 72 × 1.5 =
$108. But since $8 would be paid out of the fund, the remaining cost for the
Enforcer would only be $100. Hence, the threat to inflict it, and to stop an
ongoing harm of $100, would be credible. Thus, setting a fund of just over
$8 would make the threat to sanction credible and lead the Violator to cease
the activity.
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solution to:
c(s) − U = h.

If s ∗ (U ) > b, the Violator would prefer to stop the Violation, forgo the benefit b, and avoid the sanction s ∗ (U ). Thus, the minimum necessary fund
to induce the Violator to forgo the benefit b and refrain from the violation,
denoted by U(b), must satisfy
s ∗ (U (b))  b.
Thus,
U(b) = α + βb − h.
Notice that the cost of the divisible sanction to the Enforcer is significantly smaller by the amount h than the cost of a simple sanction, α + βb.
Under plausible conditions, it is also cheaper than the cost of a simple
reward, b.6
The above scenario exploits the divisibility effect in a situation where
the Enforcer employs simple sanctions. However, the Enforcer can do even
better—i.e., deter the harmful activity at a lower cost—by using Reversible
Rewards that combine the divisibility effect with the double-wedge effect.
Now, the money in the fund is offered to the Violator in return for ceasing the activity or, alternatively, to the Enforcer for financing the sanction
against a non-compliant Violator. The minimum necessary fund to induce
the Violator refrain from the activity, U(b), must now satisfy
U (b)  b − s ∗ (U (b)).
The Violator’s choice is either to refrain from the activity and accept the
reward of U (b) or engage in the activity with a payoff of b − s ∗ (U (b)).
6. The cost of the enforcement fund is lower than a simple reward whenever
α + βb − h < b, or b < (h − α)/(β − 1). The smaller the fixed cost of sanction and the
greater the variable cost, the more likely the enforcement fund to be cheaper than a simple
reward.
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If it inflicts the sanction, the Enforcer stops the harm but incurs a cost of
c(s) − U . If the Enforcer does not, it incurs a cost the harm, h. Thus, when
c(s) = α + βs, then
h +U −α
s ∗ (U ) =
β
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The Enforcer will thus choose the minimum U that is sufficient to induce
the Violator to refrain from the detrimental activity, which yields:
U (b) =

α + βb − h
1+β

4. The Limits of Reversible Rewards
This section identifies two significant limitations of reversible rewards.

4.1. Generic versus Unique Violations
The last example in Section 3 demonstrated that when the cost of sanction is divisible (that is, part of it can be spent upfront and the remainder ex
post), reversible rewards are cheaper than simple sanctions, because they
require a smaller upfront sunk cost. In that example, the size of the precommitted fund necessary for a simple sanction was $20, whereas the size
of the pre-committed fund necessary for a simple sanction was only $8. The
reversible reward mechanism dominated the simple sanction.
But now imagine that the violation is “generic”: many sequential violators are all engaged in identical consecutive conduct and causing identical harm, and must all be separately deterred. In this scenario, a separate
reversible reward of $8 would be necessary for each of the potential violators, because the money in the fund must in fact be paid out—either as
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Relative to the simple-sanction fund, the reversible reward fund reduces
the size of the minimum necessary fund by a multiplier of 1/(1 + β). Without the reversible reward, that is, exploiting the divisibility effect alone,
the fund needed to be endowed with at least α + βb − h for the subsequent threat to be credible. Thus, just like in the basic analysis of reversible
rewards (Remark 2 above), any time β > 0—that is, anytime the cost of
the sanction increases with the size of the sanction—the reversible reward
achieves full deterrence at a lower cost than a simple divisible sanction fund.
A reversible reward is also cheaper than a simple reward any time U (b) < b,
namely, α − h < b. Unless the fixed cost of sanction, α, is so high as to overshadow all other costs, the reversible reward scheme makes enforcement
more affordable.
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7. Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2009) discuss the dynamics of such sequential
enforcement schemes in the context of resource constrained prosecutors negotiating plea
bargaining.
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a reward for compliance or as a reimbursement for punishment. A simple sanction regime, by contrast, would require only a one-time investment of $20, which could be repeatedly used to deter each of the violators,
because violators would be deterred without depleting the fund. As long
as the potential violators can be arranged along some order—chronological
or otherwise—such that the Enforcer can threaten them one by one with a
sanction, guaranteeing one’s compliance before moving on to the next violator, the single fund of $20 could be repeatedly leveraged.7
This is a familiar advantage of sanctions over any type of rewards. When
successful in deterring violations, they need not be inflicted. While it might
be costlier to set up a pre-committed fund to make the threat credible, once
the fund is established, it can be exploited repeatedly at no additional cost.
Enforcers who deal with multiple potential violators are therefore likely
to prefer one large simple sanction fund—assuming that they do not have
liquidity or budget constraints that would prevent them from amassing the
funds upfront—that can be used several times over many small reversible
reward funds that are paid out and can be used only once, each.
Accordingly, reversible rewards are likely to be more useful in scenarios involving a one-of-a-kind violation. If, say, there is only one potential
Violator—such as an individual litigation matter involving one plaintiff and
one defendant—the advantage to repeated use of an enforcement fund is
irrelevant. Similarly, if the separate sequential violations are aimed at different Enforcers, the single sanctioning fund loses its advantage. This is
also true in a setting where there may be multiple Violators but where the
Enforcer cares only about the behavior of one primary Violator. For example, in Section 5 we examine an international setting where the Enforcer (the
EU or the United States) cares only about violations by the largest Violator
(China), which has the ability to inflict significant damage. In this scenario,
reversible rewards outperform a simple sanction.
Generic violations also manifest particularly difficult moral hazard problems. In utilizing reversible rewards, the Enforcer must avoid setting a
precedent that all good behavior can be made subject to the payment of
the reward. Otherwise, multiple individuals would have the incentive to
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present themselves as potential Violators whose compliance must be bought
off with rewards. Reversible rewards are thus suited to strategic settings
where the recipient of the reward can be ex ante specified and the use of the
reversible reward thereby limited to a unique entity and a unique situation—
akin to a single plaintiff in a discrete litigation setting.

The pre-commitment element of the fund requires that the money would
be truly sunk. As noted above, the problem of pre-commitment has been
studied before and does not pose new analytical difficulty when applied to
the reversible reward device. The pre-commitment could be accomplished
by depositing funds in an irrevocable trust, whereby the trustee is barred
from accommodating any conflicting ex post instructions by the fund’s initiator. While contract law does not recognize the power of parties to write
non-modifiable binary contracts (Jolls, 1997), trust law provides a legal
framework to make effective hands-tying commitments (Davis, 2006).
When there are limits to the ability of enforcers to set up legal trusts to
fulfill the pre-commitment, other mechanisms can be potentially applied.
An Enforcer can contract with an administrator to manage the reversible
reward scheme, relying on the reputation of the administrator to prevent ex
post modifications. Banks, law firms, arbitrators, and even websites (e.g.,
StickK.com) specialize in providing such commitment service and sometimes are bound by professional ethics to preserve the original commitment.
Still, we recognize that commitment can be difficult and costly to
achieve and that any enforcement device that ultimately depends on
pre-commitment—simple sanctions and rewards, as well as reversible
rewards—might fail. The advantage of reversible rewards would then fail
to materialize in the same way simple sanctions and simple rewards lacking
credibility would also fail.

5. Applications
This section illustrates the potential usefulness of reversible rewards in
various legal settings, where one party seeks to credibly and cost-effectively
change the incentives of another party. Whether it is to perform a contract,
refrain from harmful conduct, or settle a suit, the affected party can combine
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5.1. Settlement Bargaining
Reversible rewards can be employed by a defendant to improve its strategic position and secure a more favorable settlement.8 The defendant establishes a fund and offers the money in it to the plaintiff as settlement. If
the plaintiff turns down this settlement offer, the defendant uses the money
in the fund to pay attorneys to mount a non-compromising defense. To
the extent that such defense would make it costlier for the plaintiff to
win a judgment, the plaintiff would be better off accepting the settlement
offer.
Consider the following illustration. A plaintiff has a claim that, if
litigated, would lead to a judgment of $100. If unopposed, the plaintiff would
incur no litigation costs. If, instead, the defendant stonewalls the claim,
the plaintiff ’s litigation cost would rise. For simplicity, assume that if the
defendant spends any amount C on litigation, the plaintiff would also have
to spend an equal amount C to win the $100. In this scenario, the defendant has no incentive to drag the plaintiff to litigation: he prefers to pay
$100 outright in settlement rather than incur $100 + C in litigation. Thus,
8. Others have noted how fee arrangements with attorney can affect the strategic
structure of settlement bargaining. See, e.g., Bebchuk and Guzman (1996); Croson and
Mnookin (1996). Croson and Mnookin examine the effect of pre-committed fee on the
plaintiff’s ability to extract a settlement. Here, instead, we demonstrate the effect of a
pre-committed fund on the defendant’s ability to lower the settlement.
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rewards and sanctions to generate incentives more cheaply than by using
sanctions or rewards alone.
Most of our examples focus on private enforcement. In general,
reversible rewards are less well suited for public enforcement. Government
agencies can credibly deter violations based on their public authority to
impose sanctions, coupled with their sunk budgets to enforce law. Some
public agencies, however, face budgetary constraints that limit their ability to sanction violations in a way that dilutes the deterrent effect of public enforcement. In some settings, reversible rewards may therefore reduce
the costs of public enforcement as well, allowing the agencies to pursue a
greater number of violations with the same level of resources, without the
downside of diluting the individual violators’ incentives to comply. Section
5.5 illustrates one such application.
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5.2. International Enforcement9
Enforcement problems are particularly challenging in the international
context. In the near absence of effective supranational enforcement bodies,
9.

This section is based on Bradford and Ben-Shahar (2011).
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the defendant’s threat to litigate and impose costs on the plaintiff is not
credible.
The defendant can, instead, utilize a reversible reward in the following
way. He would deposit $50 in the fund and offer this sum as final settlement to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff turns down the $50 settlement from
the fund and insists on a higher settlement, the money in the fund could
be used only to fund litigation cost, up to the full value of $50, which is
pre-committed in the fund. Now, the plaintiff would be willing to settle for
$50 to avoid litigation, because litigation would yield him a payoff of $50
($100 judgment minus the litigation costs needs to match the plaintiff ’s,
$50). Because the fund is sunk, the defendant’s threat to spend the money
to litigate the case is credible. As long as the defendant cannot use the $50
in the fund to pay for a settlement greater than $50 (that is, as long as the
maximum settlement paid from the fund is set at $50), the defendant can
credibly threaten to litigate by paying an extra $50 rather than settling for
the full $100.
In this example, the reversible reward scheme saves the defendant half of
the settlement costs by reducing the cost from $100 to $50. In general, the
magnitude of the saving depends on the “sanction” that the defendant can
impose—i.e., on the proportion by which the plaintiff ’s costs would rise
when the defendant spends C in litigation. If, for example, the plaintiff ’s
costs rise only by 1/2C, then the settlement offer would have to be $67.
Practically, for this technique to work, the defendant has to set up the
fund in such a way that would make it impossible to use the money in any
way other than stipulated. Specifically, the defendant has to contract with
an attorney such that if the settlement offer from the fund is turned down,
the attorney must launch a defense with the full sum available in the fund
and cannot free the money to pay for higher settlement offers. Otherwise,
the plaintiff would be able to undermine this scheme by counter offering a
settlement of a little less than $100.
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10. These enforcement problems are often magnified by collective actions problems. International treaties aimed at solving global cooperation problems are notoriously
hard to enforce. International organizations and courts are limited in their ability to levy
sanctions on free riders. Individual countries and ad hoc coalitions can at times coordinate sanctions for violations, but for problems of global importance coordination is often
elusive.
11. In the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, China requested that developed countries commit one percent of their GDP—amounting to over $300 billion annually—to a
fund that would help China and other developing countries to comply with the proposed
climate treaty. Levi (2009).
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states are not able to rely on an objective third party carrying out enforcement on their behalf. Instead, states are often left to solve their disputes
through various diplomatic, political, or—at the most extreme cases—
military means. While international law operates in the public sphere, it
can effectively be analyzed through the lens of private enforcement model,
in which states operate as private enforcers to safeguard their rights with
little help from a centralized “police” (Posner and Sykes, 2011). Specifically, states may resort to economic sanctions, and occasionally even to the
use of military force—but these tactics are costly and often unsuccessful.
Trade sanctions, for example, impose costs on the sanctioning state whose
firms and consumers are deprived from the benefits of economic exchange.
Other times, states try to enforce international law by offering rewards to
violators if they cease their harmful activity. The United States could, for
instance, offer direct cash transfer to compensate a polluting country for the
cost of reducing pollution and retrofitting its plants. But these rewards, too,
are costly and often domestically contentious.10
The ongoing effort to negotiate a new global climate change treaty is
an illustrative example of a costly enforcement challenge. Recent efforts to
enact a new global climate treaty have failed because “enforcers”—states
eager to reduce emissions—have been unable to persuade “violators” to
join a treaty. The cost of buying off the cooperation of countries like China
would simply be too high—China has requested an annual transfer of $300
billion from developed countries to change its emissions practices.11 The
cost of levying effective trade sanctions on economic powers like China is
also prohibitive.
In principle, reversible rewards could generate more compliance than the
reliance on sanctions or rewards alone. The scheme would work as follows.
Enforcers—led by the EU, joined by other states including, possibly, the
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United States—would set up a fund. Instead of endowing it with the full
$300 billion, which China is demanding for joining the treaty, Enforcers
would deposit only about half the amount in the fund. The fund would
reward China for compliance, by financing transformation of its energy
infrastructure, transferring environmental technologies, or paying for a host
of other tangible inducements. However, if China fails to join a treaty or to
fully comply with it, the money in the fund would be used to reimburse
Enforcers for the costs of inflicting sanctions against China. If the sanction consisted of a carbon border tax, the fund could compensate adversely
affected domestic parties or pay the cost of administering the tariff. Or the
fund could grant subsidies for industries that compete with Chinese manufacturers. It could also be used to cover the costs of mitigating the damage
from China’s possible trade retaliation. Thus, a reversible reward of $150
billion would create an inducement that is roughly equal to a simple reward
of $300 billion.
In this context, reversible rewards entail a secondary advantage in
that they may mitigate the collective action problem among the various
Enforcers who have the incentive to free ride on each other’s enforcement
efforts. By using a pre-committed fund, each state’s participation is measured not by the sanctions it actually levies (on which they have an incentive to cheat and which are hard to monitor), but instead by the amount it
contributes to the fund. Unless everybody contributes, no one contributes.
Later, if sanctions turn out to be necessary, enforcers have fewer incentives
to defect and free ride because their cost of sanctioning is fully reimbursed
from the fund. Moreover, coordinating the sanctions through a centralized
fund makes it possible to allocate the enforcement burden in the most efficient way. For instance, if the cost of imposing sanctions to one Enforcer
is particularly high, this Enforcer does not need to participate in the actual
sanctioning and can instead shoulder the burden by paying more to the fund.
We recognize the practical difficulties involved in implementing
reversible rewards in a situation involving multiple Violators and multiple
Enforcers. The moral hazard problem looms particularly severe because
a reward-based mechanism could induce states to portray themselves as
Violators and condition their compliance on receiving the reward. Even
“genuine” Violators like China might raise their emissions in an effort to
ratchet up the reward that the coalition of Enforcers would offer for their
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compliance. To mitigate the moral hazard problem, the Enforcers would
have to find the way to limit the rewards to genuine Violators. These would
be states that stand to be net losers under the climate treaty or states that are
economically dependent on outside funding to comply with the treaty. Or
simply, Enforcers could offer a reversible reward only to China. Most other
countries either emit too little to justify enforcement action or can credibly
be deterred by a mere threat of sanctions.

Reversible rewards can be used outside the formal legal system to foster
private ordering. For instance, they may be used to deter small nuisances that
are too costly to enforce. Neighborly grievances—whether they concern a
neighbor building an ugly fence or refusing to cut a tree that hangs over
the neighboring property—can be difficult to enforce. Relative to the harm
they cause, they are often too costly to stop through formal enforcement
channels.
Imagine that your neighbor is dumping his garbage on your lawn every
week. He is doing it to save a garbage removal cost of $100. You could
offer to pay for his garbage removal ($100), but that may seem too costly
and unfair. Alternatively, you could hire someone to dump the garbage back
at the neighbor’s lot, but this too would cost you at least $100. A reversible
rewards would enable you to terminate your neighbor’s practice at half the
cost compared with using sticks or carrots alone. You could set aside $50
and offer it as a reward to the neighbor for ceasing the dumping. If dumping
continues, the entire fund would be paid to a garbage service to dump (half
of) the garbage back on your neighbor’s lawn. As a result, the $50 in the fund
works twice: once as a (half) carrot and once as a (half) stick. If the neighbor
continues to dump, he will lose twice—the $50 reward, followed by the
retaliation measures that $50 can buy. A compliance that would otherwise
cost $100 to secure would now cost merely $50.
A similar approach can be used to address contract breach. A contracting
party may want to prevent a harmful breach, but cannot do so by merely
threatening to sue for damages because the cost of securing a remedy is high
(e.g., the cost of litigation), or the remedy would not fully compensate the
injured party (e.g., the Enforcer could not obtain consequential damages).
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5.4. Foreclosure
Carrying out foreclosure of mortgaged property or eviction of residential rental property is expensive for mortgage lenders and for landlords. It
is time consuming, legally costly, often harmful to the property. Plus, it is
simply unpleasant. Indeed, properties coming out of foreclosure sell for a
substantial discount, sometimes exceeding 25% of the value of the property
(Taub, 2010).
To avoid the costs of evicting the defaulting homeowners through litigation and foreclosure proceedings, creditors can instead offer a reward for
those who depart voluntarily and swiftly. But as long as homeowners can
impose substantial costs on the creditors by refusing to vacate the property,
the reward necessary to buy their compliance might be substantial. Instead,
then, creditors could use reversible rewards. Money would be placed in a
fund specifically aimed at foreclosing a particular property. It would be
offered as reward to a homeowner that voluntary vacates the property in
good condition. If the homeowner fails to vacate the premises, the funds
would be used to cover the costs of the evictions. In fact, the foreclosure
reversible reward fund could be established ex ante and financed by the
homeowner. A condition to securing a mortgage could be a contribution by
the borrower into a fund that would remain untouched until some fraction of
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Faced with an impending breach, the Enforcer can instead offer a bonus for
adequate performance (the bonus being offered above the already agreed
upon price). But if the bonus is structured as a reversible reward, it could be
half the size of the otherwise-needed incentive payment The bonus would
be offered with the clear message that if it is turned down and the breach
occurs, the funds reserved for the bonus would instead be used to finance
the cost of litigation.
The reversible reward scheme is also applicable when a party is trying to
induce another party to work harder—an employer asking an employee to
exert greater effort. In fact, workers are already subject to combined bonus
and sanction policies. We could also imagine that employers use reversible
rewards in negotiating with labor unions by offering them a small pay rise
coupled with the threat of reversing the earmarked funds to pay for their
costs of enduring a potential strike by the organized labor.
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5.5. Whistleblower Rewards
In general, reversible rewards are not useful in criminal law because of
the problem of multiple, generic violations. It is better to commit funds
to sanctions than to pay people for not offending. However, in some specific scenarios, law enforcement is already bolstered by rewards and can be
improved if the rewards were reversible. Examples of the use of rewards
in criminal investigations involve the whistleblower rewards in connection with securities fraud or cartel investigations. The Dodd-Frank Act, for
instance, authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to use
substantial cash rewards to whistleblowers that voluntarily provide the SEC
with information that allows it to successfully prosecute securities law violations. The reward is financed by the monetary sanctions the SEC recovers through (civil or criminal) proceedings involving violations of securities
laws12 Antitrust enforcement against cartel activity is similarly bolstered by
encouraging self-reporting: those who report their cartel activity and cooperate with the antitrust authorities can obtain immunity and, in some places,
are even offered rewards (Office of Fair Trading).
Reversible whistleblower rewards increase deterrence more than simple
sanctions, because they harness the insider information to increase detection
(in the same way that self-reporting makes detection cheaper) (Kaplow and
Shavell, 1994). Members of the cartel would be more likely to defect from
the cartel when cooperation with the antitrust authorities would yield them a
dual benefit: not only would they escape the penalty, but they would also be
entitled to a reward. Linking the funding of the whistleblower reward and
12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111–203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010).
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the mortgage is paid off or until default occurs. If the mortgage is paid off,
the money would be returned to the homeowner. If, instead, default occurs,
the fund is immediately withdrawn and offered as reward to the homeowner
for immediate departure, else used by the creditor to cover foreclosure costs.
A reversible reward fund structured this way would convert the enforcement
task from a generic one (rewarding all homeowners for vacating their properties voluntarily) into a specific one (each fund being limited to a single
homeowner).
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the expenditures of government resources to the investigation of a given
suspected cartel or industry would allow the antitrust authorities to offer a
smaller reward without diluting the dual effect of its enforcement regime.

6. Concluding Remarks
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This paper has demonstrated a novel way in which rewards and sanctions
can be combined to reduce private enforcement costs. The idea is to earmark
funds that a private party can subsequently use to purchase either a carrot
or a stick. By pre-committing the enforcement funds, a reward can be reinforced with a (subsequently costless) threat of sanction. This enforcement
scheme doubles the deterrent effect on the Violator.
Reversible rewards can be used to improve compliance in a socially
desirable way, for example, by enticing private parties to perform their contracts or countries to pursue efforts to halt climate change. But reversible
rewards can also be used in socially harmful ways. For example, a dominant
firm seeking to reduce competition can try to intimidate its competitors. It
can use rewards (e.g., bribes to competitors to leave a market) or sanctions
(e.g. predatory pricing). But since both strategies are costly, a reversible
reward could induce the competitor to acquiesce where it otherwise would
not and thus allow the dominant firm to capture the market at a smaller
cost. Accordingly, the analysis in this paper has no general normative tone.
It merely develops a scheme to reduce the costs of private enforcement.
Why have reversible rewards not been used in practice? One reason is
their limitation to specific as opposed to generic violations. The idea that
sanctions are, indeed, superior as long as the Enforcer can credibly commit to inflicting them is also deeply entrenched in scholarly and public discourse. Most efforts to enhance compliance have therefore been directed at
searching for ways to bolster sanctions’ credibility. Yet the inability to credibly commit to sanctioning continues to undermine enforcement schemes
across numerous areas of private and international law. This limit of simple
sanctions has provided the motivation for this paper.
Elements of the reversible rewards scheme are familiar from bounty
arrangements. Defendants who post bail are deterred from fleeing in two
ways: first, a fleeing defendant loses the bail money; and second, the money
that he posted and forfeited can be used to fund bounty hunters, which
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